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Abstract 
Battle with COVID-19 turned out to be a marathon, not a sprint, and behavioral adjustments 
have been unavoidable to stay viable. In this paper, we employ a data-centric approach to 
investigate individual mobility adaptations and mask-wearing in Seoul, South Korea. We first 
identify six epidemic phases and two waves based on COVID-19 case count and its geospatial 
dispersion. The phase-specific linear models reveal the strong, self-driven mobility reductions in 
the first escalation and peak with a common focus on public transit use and less-essential 
weekend/afternoon trips. However, comparable reduction was not present in the second wave, as 
the shifted focus from mobility to mask-wearing was evident. Although no lockdowns and gentle 
nudge to wear mask seemed counter-intuitive, simple and persistent communication on personal 
safety has been effective and sustainable to induce cooperative behavioral adaptations. Our phase-
specific analyses and interpretation highlight the importance of targeted response consistent with 
the fluctuating epidemic risk. 
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1. Introduction 
Mobility intervention has been embraced as one of the most effective and immediate control 
measures since the early days of COVID-19 pandemic, and universal quarantines such as 
lockdown and shelter-in-place have shown measurable success. Sjödin et al.1 conducted a 
modeling study to show that the lockdown duration could be shortened when household size and 
time spent outside one’s home were brief. Since household size could not be easily changed, the 
study concluded that strict quarantine measures are the key to reduce its duration. Leung et al.2 
showed that reproduction number has dropped below 1 after lockdowns in 14 Chinese provinces, 
and the fatality risk could also be decreased. Based on the Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered model, 
the study projected that premature relaxation of lockdown measures would increase the cumulative 
case count exponentially. López and Rodó3 used a stochastic Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-
Recovered to project the epidemic progression after lockdown, suggesting that another larger scale 
infection wave is likely if lockdown measures were alleviated prematurely and abruptly.  
Although strong mobility stringency can minimize uncertainties arising from individual 
differences to achieve prompt and well-coordinated response, high social and economic costs have 
been inevitable. Suppressing personal mobility was found to deepen economic inequalities4,5, 
generate disconnects among communities6, and even cause mental illness7. As the pandemic 
prolonged, concerns over accumulating costs and exit strategies have deepened. Phased exit 
strategy, prioritizing people at the highest risk, and managing misinformation were suggested to 
reduce unintended cost in the post-lockdown period8.  
Another key control measure of massive testing and contact-tracing has shown promising 
outcomes in several countries including South Korea9. However, a recent study found that such 
approaches are feasible only when case numbers remain at a manageable level, and the success of 
prevention measures depends on the population’s behavioral changes in response10. Hellewell et 
al.11 stated that contact tracing and isolation without mobility reduction might not be sufficient to 
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contain the outbreak under plausible scenarios.  
Even if the testing-contact-tracing has been effective to contain the outbreak, it cannot serve 
as a direct incentive to induce behavioral adaptations. The main motivation of our study is 
consistent with the aforementioned studies, and we aim to evaluate the role of mobility when case 
numbers remain at a traceable level. Several recent studies also emphasized the need to understand 
behavioral aspects and perception changes regarding policy adherence12, and the importance of 
mobility data analyses for a broader understanding of the efficacy of public communication and 
social distancing interventions13. Despite the urgent need for adaptive mobility policy targeting 
behavioral adaptations, there are limited academic and technical resources available. It is 
encouraging, however, that an increasing number of researches utilize large-scale near-real time 
datasets to study the interrelationship among mobility change, social impact, and policy 
response5,6,14. 
In this paper, we employ data-centric approaches to trace the evolution of mobility behavioral 
adaptation and its relationship to epidemic progression in Seoul, South Korea for the first 189 days 
(27 weeks). As the 4th country infected with COVID-19, the nation had been the worst-affected 
country outside China in the beginning15. However, the nation has managed to control the infection 
rate under 20.99 per million population since January 20, 2020 without lockdown-type mandates. 
The nation’s capital Seoul also has been able to contain the maximum daily confirmed cases under 
52 or 5.34 per million population in the same period with minimal mobility restrictions.  
Due to the time-dependent and transient nature of epidemic progression and mobility patterns, 
modeling their relationship over the entire 27 weeks is meaningless. As the first step, we propose 
a framework to identify epidemic phases based on the case count as well as the geospatial spread 
of COVID-19. The mobility patterns are represented with the reductions in subway ridership 
(public transit) and traffic volume (private mode) compared to the same period of 2019, given the 
mobility network under full operations. Association between mobility and epidemic progression 
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is then modeled as linear models in six epidemic phases using a changing point detection technique. 
Seasonality specific to mobility including the day-of-week and the time-of-day effect is also 
evaluated to discover common focus in mobility decisions. Lastly, findings from the statistical 
analyses are assessed with risk perception and facemask use in a collective manner. 
  
2. Method  
2.1. Determination of epidemic phases  
The major transitions in epidemic progression were determined by detecting the major 
structural changes in daily case counts with a changing point detection (CPD) method of 
breakpoint detection algorithms16,17. The algorithms simultaneously detect the major interventions 
in sequential data, and have been widely used in multiple disciplines including finance18-21, 
genetics22,23, climate change24,25, social science26-28, ecology29, and geology30,31. In our analysis, 
the intercept-only linear model of 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝜖 was assumed to detect the day of major structural 
change, and used in the COVID-19 case count analysis and the mobility seasonality analysis.  
Although the breakpoint analysis method detects the structural changes in a robust manner, 
sequential data in general represent long-term trends in a retrospective manner, and is sensitive to 
the timespan under investigation. To complement such shortcomings, we propose to measure the 
geospatial progression of COVID-19 in addition to the confirmed case count. Conceptually, it is 
intuitive that quantifying spatial dispersion provides useful insights for an infectious disease like 
COVID-19, as the risk cannot be the same when 100 new cases are located in a single location 
versus spread evenly across a region. Methodologically, we employed two topological measures 
of grouped distance (𝑑𝑔) and Hausdorff distance (𝑑𝐻). Since both measures represent the distance 
between two sets, one can reduce the two-day changes into single metrics. If the daily case 
sequence represents the long-term trend, the topological measures are designed to capture the 
short-term momentum. 
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Given the set of locations exposed by COVID-19 patients, which we call the contact locations, 
let  𝑃𝑡 = {𝑝𝑡: 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑡} be the set of all contact locations of day t. The 
grouped distance between 𝑃𝑡  and 𝑃𝑡+1  is defined as 𝑑𝑔(𝑃𝑡, 𝑃𝑡+1) =
1
|𝑃𝑡|∙|𝑃𝑡+1|
∑ ‖𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡+1‖𝑝𝑡∈𝑃𝑡,𝑝𝑡+1∈𝑃𝑡+1 . It is the average distance to reach from a point in 𝑃𝑡  to 
points in 𝑃𝑡+1, representing proximity of two sets. While small 𝑑𝑔 indicates 𝑃𝑡 and 𝑃𝑡+1 are 
more concentrated in a local cluster, large 𝑑𝑔   indicates they are more scattered. Hausdorff 
distance is defined as 𝑑𝐻(𝑃𝑡+1, 𝑃𝑡) = max
𝑝𝑡+1∈𝑃𝑡+1
min
𝑝𝑡∈𝑃𝑡
‖𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡‖, which is the maximum distance 
to reach from 𝑃𝑡+1 to 𝑃𝑡. Large 𝑑𝐻 is observed when at least one new case occurred far from 
the existing mass. 
Both measures are bounded between 0 and the length of the major axis of the geographical 
boundary. Theoretically, both measures can reach zero if the existing mass was a single cluster, 
and new cases also belong to the same cluster. Likewise, both measures can reach near the 
maximum when new cases are located in the opposite corner from the existing mass. Once the 
contact locations start to spread and fill up the region, 𝑑𝑔  will remain close to half of the 
maximum, while 𝑑𝐻 will be much smaller than that. More formally, 𝑑𝐻 > 𝑑𝑔 means that there 
exists at least one location on day 𝑡 + 1 that contains none of the contact locations of day 𝑡 
within the radius of 𝑑𝑔. Conversely, 𝑑𝑔 > 𝑑𝐻 means that all locations of day 𝑡 + 1 contain at 
least one of the locations of day 𝑡 within 𝑑𝑔. In our context, new cases need to be closer to the 
existing mass when existing cases are scattered with less concentration, yielding 𝑑𝑔 ≫ 𝑑𝐻, which 
is the geospatial peak. In the analysis, the metric 𝑑𝑔 − 𝑑𝐻 was used to identify the geospatial 
peak period compared to the geospatial contraction and expansion.  
Once the epidemic phases of trigger, escalation, peak, and de-escalation phases were 
established using both the count interventions and the topological metric, the relationship between 
mobility and epidemic progression was modeled as linear models by individual phases. In the 
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bivariate linear model, the response variable is the mobility reduction, and the COVID-19 count 
is the regressor.  
 
2.2. Data  
There are four main datasets used in the study – the hourly subway ridership and traffic volume, 
COVID-19 case counts and contact locations, risk perception of COVID-19 infection, and 
universal mask adoption rate. While the mobility and COVID-19 data were direct observations, 
risk perception and mask adoption rate were based on Likert scale responses sourced from a series 
of cross-sectional surveys. Subway ridership included the number of passengers getting on and off 
at 275 stations of subway lines 1 through 8, aggregated in hourly intervals. Traffic volume included 
the number of vehicles at 100 sensor stations located in the city’s major road links. To incorporate 
the strong seasonality in mobility demand, changes were measured in the amount of reduction 
compared to the same period of 2019 as 1 −
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 2020
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 2019
, by matching the closest day-of-week. 
For instance, Friday, February 7, 2020, was matched with Friday, February 8, 2019. COVID-19 
daily confirmed case counts and contact tracing information were sourced from multiple sources 
including Kaggle COVID-19 open data, KCDC (Korea Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention), and Seoul Metropolitan government. Daily data values are 7-day simple moving 
averages unless noted otherwise.  
Regarding risk perception and universal mask adoption rate, we resorted to several 
independent survey results due to the lack of direct observation data and its highly qualitative 
nature. Two types of risk perception—overall risk of COVID-19 and risk of personal infection—
were obtained from biweekly surveys conducted by Hankook Research. Overall risk of COVID-
19 represents the percentage of people who responded that the spread of the pandemic within the 
nation was “very” or “somewhat” serious. Risk of personal infection represents the percentage of 
people who responded that the likelihood of contracting the virus was more than or equal to 50%32. 
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The rate of universal mask adoption was based on five independent survey outcomes33-37, which 
captured the proportion of the surveyed having worn masks whenever necessary. Additional details 
and availability of data used are included in the supplementary. 
3. Results 
3.1. Determination of COVID-19 phases 
In Figure 1-a, the breakpoint analysis results of COVID-19 case count trend are shown with 
four interventions, yielding five phases divided on day 50, 82, 128, 156. In Figure 1-b, 𝑑𝑔 − 𝑑𝐻 
is shown with four transition days on 29, 82, 106, 169. When combined, we have 7 transition points 
in total. Although not detected in case counts, day 28 can be considered as the transition from a 
trigger to an escalation phase. Day 50 is the start of the peak phase in the first wave. Day 82 is the 
transition from the peak to a de-escalation. Day 106 divides the third phase into the de-escalation 
of the first wave and the escalation of the second wave. Day 128 is the start of the second wave 
peak. Although one can speculate day 156 is the start of a de-escalation, the case counts are not 
low enough compared to the first de-escalation. Moreover, 𝑑𝑔 − 𝑑𝐻 stayed positive until day 168, 
suggesting the second peak had continued closer to 168. Although the validity of spatial dispersion 
results after day 169 is limited due to the contact location availability (see Supplementary Note 1), 
it is unlikely that the city had entered a de-escalation phase with 𝑑𝑔 − 𝑑𝐻 being mostly positive. 
As results, we defined six epidemic phases as the trigger (1-29), escalation-1 (30-50), peak-1 (51-
82), de-escalation (83-106), escalation-2 (107-128), and peak-2 (129-189). 
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a. Major Interventions in Epidemic Progression b. Grouped Distance – Hausdorff Distance 
  
 
c. Epidemic Phases 
 
Figure 1. Epidemic phase determination. a. breakpoint analysis results of major structural 
changing points yielding five phases; b. periods of geospatial peak vs geospatial 
expansion/contraction yielding five phases; c. resulting six phases. 
 
3.2. Association between epidemic progression and mobility  
Linear model results are shown in Figure 2. In subway ridership, an addition of a single case 
resulted in an additional 4.1% reduction in escalation-1, which converted to a 0.5% recovery in 
escalation-2. In traffic volume, the additional reduction was 1.3% in escalation-1, and a 0.1% 
recovery in escalation-2. Between two peaks, the constant 40.8% subway ridership reduction in 
peak-1 was decreased to 20.9% in peak-2. Traffic volume shows recovery from an 8.8% reduction 
to 4.2% with a 0.1% additional recovery per additional new case.  
The results provide several useful insights. The reduction ratio between public transit (subway) 
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to private trip mode (traffic volume) was approximately 4 to 1, manifesting the strong shift in mode 
preference. One can also infer that the reductions of approximately 40% in public transit use and 
10% in traffic volume are possible upper-bounds of voluntary mobility adjustment, and equivalent 
to 32 day delay to enter the de-escalation phase. Strong positive linearity in escalation-1 combined 
with the maximum reduction throughout peak-1 indicates the public’s willingness to embrace 
behavioral adjustment with rising infection risk, even without stringent mobility policy. However, 
conversion from the strong positive in the first escalation to marginally negative linearity in the 
second indicates significant changes in the public’s perception of mobility as the main means of 
personal safety.  
 
Figure 2. Linear model fit of mobility reduction vs. confirmed cases of six epidemic phases. 
𝛽0(𝑠) and 𝛽1(𝑠) are the intercept and coefficient of subway reduction vs. confirmed cases model. 
𝛽0(𝑡) and 𝛽1(𝑡) are the intercept and coefficient of traffic reduction vs. confirmed cases model. 
(𝛽 values with *, **, *** indicate that the p-values are smaller than significance levels of 0.05, 
0.01, 0.001, respectively.)  
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3.3. Seasonality in mobility  
Since mobility patterns are embedded with strong seasonality, mobility patterns were evaluated 
for its time-of-day and day-of-week effects. As shown in Figure 3, the overall trends of two trip 
modes are similar except in magnitude, and public transit demand continues to recover as early as 
day 63 (week 9). The subway ridership shows reductions at least three times larger than traffic 
volume, which agrees with our findings in section 3.2. It is also worth noting that the subway has 
continued operations during the epidemic, serving more than 50% of the usual demand. Despite 
the strong preference shift to private mode, public transit has remained a vital urban mobility 
option, especially to those with limited mode choices. 
It is notable that the first major interventions of two modes agree on day 34 (week 5), which is 
before any major government response is put in place. Moreover, weekends, nighttime, and 
afternoon trips show larger reductions compared to weekdays and commute hours. Under low 
policy stringency, such outcomes strongly suggest that early mobility reduction had been driven 
by proactive individual adaptations with a common focus on reducing non-essential trips while 
preserving the essential commute trips in private mode. Continuous recovery after the de-
escalation signifies changes in public perception regarding the role of mobility, which agrees with 
our findings in section 3.2. 
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Figure 3. Time-of-day and day-of week analyses of hourly mobility pattern changes. All week, 
weekday, and weekend plots show the day-of-week effect in mobility reductions. Commute hours 
(7AM-9AM & 6PM-8PM), afternoon (2PM-5PM) and nighttime (9PM-12AM) plots show time-
of-day effect. 
 
3.4. Mobility, risk perception and universal facemask use 
In this section, subway ridership reduction is assessed with the public risk perception, as it is 
the main trigger of the behavioral adjustment. In Figure 4, bi-weekly public survey outcomes32 on 
overall risk of COVID-19 (shown in solid square) vs. risk of personal infection (shown in triangle) 
are shown. The rate of universal mask use (shown in circle) and subway ridership reduction 
percentage (shown in blue) are also included. Overall, the personal infection risk perception shares 
the key characteristics of epidemic phases, as it increased during two escalation phases, remained 
over 70% during two peaks, and decreased during the de-escalation.  
It is notable that the universal facemask wearing had already reached over 60% in escalation-
1. Considering the official promotion on universal face covering had started and remained as a 
recommendation from day 63 (peak-1) to day 217 (peak-2), the public’s awareness on the benefit 
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of facemask had been in place much earlier than the government recommendation. As some studies 
suggested38, the high compliance level is likely the result of the past infectious outbreak 
experiences amplified by the current epidemic risk. Since escalation-2, mask use exceeded both 
the personal infection risk perception and the subway ridership reduction. The mask-wearing 
experiences in the earlier period seemed to have led the public to embrace the facemask as the 
longer-term personal safety measure, especially in returning to one’s mobility routines.  
It is also worth noting that the personal risk perception remained higher than the overall 
epidemic risk perception in the second wave. The government’s social distancing level also stayed 
at the lowest Level 11 during peak-2, since its level is solely determined by the case count trend. 
When the geospatial momentum is considered, it is evident that Seoul had missed the opportunity 
to contain the second peak, and the inopportune timing of national economic stimulus to promote 
in-person shopping and dining since day 10639. However, the high level of public’s risk perception 
remained as the main force to prevent rapid resurgence despite the reactive government response. 
 
 
                                           
1  South Korea has adopted a three-level social distancing scheme, where the level of 
intervention is determined based on weekly average case count and reproduction number 
within the region. In Seoul Metropolitan area, elevation from Level 1 to Level 2 occurs when 
the weekly average case count exceeds 40 and the reproduction number is higher than or equal 
to 1.3 40. Elevation from Level 2 to Level 3 occurs when a) two-week average daily toll exceeds 
100 and b) daily case count is doubled from the previous day two times within a week, but after 
c) careful review on the potential impact on the social, economic and medical costs as well as 
public and expert opinions. More details are included in Supplementary Information. 
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Figure 4. Survey results on risk perception and mask use by epidemic phases. Overall risk of 
COVID-19 is the percentage who responded that the spread of the pandemic within the nation was 
“very” or “somewhat” serious32. Risk of personal infection is the percentage who responded that 
the likelihood of contracting the virus was more than or equal to 50%32. The rate of universal mask 
use33-37 is the proportion who responded they have worn masks whenever necessary such as in 
public space.  
 
4. Discussion 
In this paper, behavioral changes during COVID-19 outbreak were evaluated in Seoul, South 
Korea focusing on mobility and facemask use under the marginal mobility restriction. The 
epidemic phases were defined based on case count and geospatial momentum. Through the phase-
specific analyses, we unraveled the true nature of inter-dependency among the epidemic 
progression, mobility, facemask and public perception. Linear models between mobility reduction 
and COVID-19 case counts revealed strong linearities during the escalation and de-escalation 
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phases of the first wave, manifesting their interactive nature. The second wave turned out to be not 
another repetition of the first wave, as mobility continued to recover regardless of fluctuating 
COVID-19 risk. The public’s risk perception showed their vigilance to closely monitor the 
epidemic progression. As the pandemic persisted for a longer period, the shift in focus from 
mobility to facemask was evident as the main means of personal safety. The results and 
interpretations were only visible after establishing the epidemic phases, which demonstrates the 
significance of multi-faceted data collection and analyses to trace the evolving evidence of the 
ongoing pandemic. 
Although low mobility stringency and gentle nudge on mask-wearing seemed counter-
intuitive to fight a pandemic, evidence from South Korea indicated otherwise. Our study 
demonstrated the self-driven nature of behavioral adaptations with shifted focus from mobility 
reduction to facemask use, showing their substitutive nature. However, KCDC noted in July 
briefing that mask-wearing rate fell close to 50% in the indoor facilities such as restaurants and 
coffee shops, where 2-meter distancing is rarely abided41. The recent domestic resurgence from 
day 207 (week 30) are mostly the clusters originated from close contacts in groups such as in 
restaurants and churches42, pushing the contact-tracing near the full capacity. Reflecting on the 
effectiveness of mobility reduction in the first escalation, our observations from the second peak 
manifest that facemask cannot be a perfect substitute for mobility restriction. Mobility policy 
should be the main prevention measure during the escalation and peak phases while the facemasks 
should serve a key enabler for the fluid mobility recovery during the de-escalation. 
COVID-19 is a pandemic we have never experienced in our modern history, but it might not 
be the last. Learning from the evolving evidence on behavioral adaptations and the resulting public 
cooperation will have a long-lasting impact to fight this pandemic, and to prepare for the next. 
However, understanding behavioral changes amid the unprepared pandemics such as COVID-19 
is a tall order. As future research, we suggest the following topics for the broader academic 
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communities to explore.  
In mobility, our study specifically focused on trip modes in mobility pattern mining, since they 
are direct observations and have been in service the whole period. From the transportation 
economics perspective, however, not only the trip mode but also the trip purposes need to be 
evaluated to fully capture the behavioral aspects, as the mode is a mere means to achieve one’s 
trip purpose. Therefore, expansive data analytics on trip purposes are imperative for adaptive and 
targeted mobility control. Moreover, analyses on trip purpose may validate the efficacy of various 
mobility controls, and to identify the high-risk sectors. Incorporating demographic groups such as 
age, gender and occupations may also broaden our understanding.  
In epidemiology, a broader set of metrics might be helpful to monitor and track the progression 
closer to real-time. In the prolonged battle with COVID-19, the importance of timely response 
empowered by fast data tracking is no less than searching for the ultimate medical interventions. 
The changing point detection method and geospatial progression measures effectively captured the 
progression of the outbreak on multiple ends. Further geometric pattern mining methodology such 
as topological data analysis43 may reveal the spatial characteristics even further, which has critical 
implications in the infectious outbreaks as COVID-19. The necessary condition of data availability 
and methodological validation must be met, and requires active and collaborative contributions of 
broader academic disciplines.  
In policy, there needs to be a framework to evaluate the efficacy and relevance of key control 
measures in a systematic and collective manner. Although the testing-contact tracing-isolating has 
proved successful in South Korea44, the process of contact tracing had unintended social impacts, 
especially on the underrepresented populations45-46. Moreover, adherence to contact tracing has 
put growing pressure on the nation’s universal healthcare system, and required an enormous 
sacrifice of the healthcare professionals47. Our study outcome strongly suggests that the public is 
willing to adapt to a reasonable level of mobility restriction, which can alleviate the enduring 
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pressure on the national healthcare infrastructure. Contribution of facemasks and social distancing 
needs to be considered as a set of policies than of competing interests.  
 
Data availability 
The data that support the findings of this study except contact tracing information are available at 
https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.c.501509348.  
 
Code availability 
Custom code that supports the findings of this study is available from the corresponding author 
upon request 
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Supplementary Note 1. COVID-19 epidemiological data description 
The epidemiological data of the first 189 days consists of two datasets: COVID-19 daily 
tolls and contact tracing information. COVID-19 daily toll data is collected from KCDC46, and 
contact tracing information is sourced from the Kaggle COVID-19 open data47 for the first 
133 days from the Seoul Metropolitan government48 since day 134. The daily toll includes 
the number of cases confirmed between 0:00 and 23:59 on the same day. Before day 43, the 
daily toll referred to cases confirmed between 16:00 of the previous day and 15:59 of the day.  
Contact tracing information is the itinerary of a confirmed patient from a few days before 
the symptom onset to the day of quarantine49. If a patient shows no symptoms at the time of 
quarantine, the itinerary of the patient is collected from a few days before the day of testing 
to the day of quarantine. The itinerary is recorded with the coordinates of stores, buildings 
visited, and the means of transportation used each day. In the case of Seoul, the 
administrative office of each of 25 districts (i.e. Gu) collects and publishes the itinerary 
information of each patient on the administrative office’s webpage, and the Seoul 
Metropolitan government also publishes the data collected from each district office on its 
official webpage. The final contact tracing data used for the calculation of the geospatial 
distance of Seoul up to day 189 contains 5,309 contact locations of 1,288 confirmed cases. 
We have used anonymized contact tracing information provided by KCDC. For data 
accessibility, please inquire directly to KCDC. 
When the outbreak first occurred in South Korea, there was no clear policy on to what 
extent the information should be disclosed. Before KCDC first distributed the first edition of 
“the disclosure of itinerary and information of confirmed patients” on day 55 (March 14), some 
privacy-sensitive information was disclosed without strict guidelines. Information released 
during this period contained travel records of all places such as nightlife venues. The legal 
guideline for information disclosure was first enacted on day 55 and has undergone two 
amendments since then. When first published, the guideline defined the purpose of the 
disclosure and specified the scope and details of information to be released. The guideline 
stated that information, such as itinerary and close contacts*, should be disclosed to the 
extent that no individual can be specified; particular places and transportation modes where 
unknown contacts might have occurred should be informed to the public. Detailed addresses 
and names of workplaces would not be disclosed unless virus transmission to unspecified 
employees was expected. This edition stated that each municipal government “may not” 
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disclose the places where the confirmed patient stayed, if all contacts were confirmed.  
The second edition of “the disclosure of itinerary and information of confirmed patients” 
was published on April 12 (day 84). This edition stated that contact information should be 
disclosed only for 14 days after the patient had the last contact. The time range was extended 
to two days before the date of symptom onset or testing. This edition specified that each 
government should notify the public about the sterilization status of places visited by 
patients. 
The third edition was announced on June 30 (day 163). This edition emphasized that each 
patient’s information should be deleted 14 days after the patient had the last contact. The 
guideline for protecting personal information has also been changed so that gender, age, 
nationality, detailed address (only provide Gu-wise information) of residence, and names of 
workplaces are not disclosed. Since this edition, information to be released has been in the 
form of a list of visited places, including region, type, name, and address of the facility, 
exposed date, and status of sterilization, instead of the itinerary form. In addition, if all 
contacts in a particular place have been identified, the information of the place visited by a 
patient “should not” be disclosed to the public. The information of cluster cases is to be 
announced by KCDC, not by municipalities. Supplementary Table 3 summarizes the changes 
in “the disclosure of itinerary and information of confirmed patients” over the three editions. 
The electrical signature check-in system, launched on June 10 (day 143), has indirectly 
affected the accessibility of contact tracing data. After the implementation of the system, 
investigators have been able to trace the close contacts of confirmed patients with more 
completion. As stated in “the disclosure of itinerary and information of confirmed patients”, 
each local government “may not” (day 84-162) or “should not” (day 163-ongoing) disclose 
the place visited by a patient if all the contacts have been identified. As this guideline was 
changed to “should not reveal such locations” on day 163, there have been more cases that 
all contacts are identified through an electric signature check-in system, leaving a 
considerable portion of contact location information unpublished.  
The electrical signature check-in system had undergone a pilot period from June 1 (day 
134) to June 7 (day 140) and began operation from June 10 (day 143). The period prior to 
June 30 (day 163) was the pre-implementation period where no legal penalties were 
imposed. Initially, implementation has been required in eight facilities classified as high-risk, 
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including pubs, nightclubs, colatech (non-alcohol nightclub), karaoke, indoor group exercise 
facilities, and indoor standing concert hall. On June 12 (day 145), the Seoul metropolitan 
government required large cram schools and PC cafes to implement the system, and on June 
21 (day 154), the KCDC further classified buffet, large cram school, door-to-door sales 
promotion facility, and logistics distribution center as high-risk facilities.  
* Contacts indicate people that a COVID-19 confirmed patient may have been in contact with. 
The scope of contacts is determined considering symptoms of the patient, mask-wearing 
status, duration of the stay, and exposed situation. All contacts, both symptomatic and 
asymptomatic, are subject to self-quarantine for 14 days with daily monitoring by public 
health staff. 
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Supplementary Note 2. Mobility data description 
The subway ridership and traffic volume of the year 2019 and 2020 are direct 
observation counts. Subway ridership data was collected from Seoul Metro50 and consists of 
the hourly number of passengers getting on and off at 275 stations. Traffic volume data, 
consisting of hourly traffic volumes at 270 locations including major road links in Seoul such 
as downtown areas, city borders, bridges, arterials, and city highways, was collected from 
Seoul TOPIS51. We used traffic volume data of 100 locations with a missing rate of less than 
0.25% in the analysis. Missing values were filled in with the median value of the traffic 
volume of the week before and after. Reductions are measured by matching the closest day-
of-week of 2020 to 2019. For instance, Friday, February 7, 2020 was matched with Friday, 
February 8, 2019. Over the 189 days, there were seven holidays; Lunar New Year (January 
24-27), Independence Movement Day (March 1), Buddha’s Birthday (April 30), Labor Day 
(May 1), Children’s Day (May 5), the Parliamentary Election (April 15), and Memorial Day 
(June 6). Holidays were matched with the corresponding 2019 holidays, except that the 
quadrennial Parliamentary Election day was matched with the closest day-of-week. Both the 
traffic volume and subway ridership data are provided in figshare45. For more details, please 
refer to our data summary paper52. 
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Supplementary Note 3. Survey source description  
Risk perception rate was obtained from a series of surveys conducted by Gallup Korea32. Risk 
perception rate was measured as the percentage of respondents in Seoul (n=193; aged 18 or 
over) who rated their level of worry related to coronavirus infection as “very worried” or 
“somewhat worried”. We retrieved the risk perception trend from a total of 16 surveys, which 
were conducted weekly between February 4 (day 16) and April 8 (day 80) and biweekly 
between April 21 (day 93) and July 16 (day 179). The survey results have been posted on its 
official website and are publicly available for research use32.  
The two surveys33 conducted in early February (day 16) and April (day 74) measured 
mask adoption rate by investigating the percentage of respondents across the nation 
(n=2,002; aged 18 or over) who have used facemasks for protection against COVID-19. 
Survey design and questionnaire are detailed in Jang et al. (2020). Gallup International also 
surveyed the percentage of respondents across the nation (n=801; aged 18 or over) who have 
adopted mask-wearing as a precautionary behavior in March (day 61)34. In addition, from a 
series of surveys conducted in late February (day 40) (n=973)35, May (day 117) (n=1,000)36, 
and June (day 162) (n=1,000)37, we collected the percentage of people across the nation who 
responded that they have “always” worn facemasks over the past week when outside the 
home. The late February survey design and results are detailed in Lee & You (2020), and the 
May, June, and July survey results were retrieved from media releases36-37.  
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Supplementary Note 4. Policy responses in South Korea  
Mobility restriction. To back up our statement that the nation has had marginal mobility 
restriction, we summarize government responses adopted throughout COVID-19 (see 
Supplementary Table 5). We also quantify the stringency of policy responses, by adopting 
scoring criteria and method of Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT)53. 
Specifically, we adopted two indices—government response index and mobility restriction 
index— to show that mobility restriction has been relatively marginal compared to overall 
government responses (see figure S1). Government response index, which was first 
proposed in the working paper of OxCGRT, is based on 13 policy indicators including 
workplace closure and stay-at-home requirement9. Mobility restriction index is calculated 
based on only 3 indicators that directly constrain mobility: public transport closure, stay-at-
home requirement, and internal movement restriction. The types of indicators as well as the 
scoring method used in this study are solely based on OxCGRT9. Scoring codebooks and 
relevant sources are detailed in Supplementary Table 5.  
 In summary, the government has not mandated stay-at-home for the public, as of Aug 13. 
The official advice has been a recommendation on not-leaving-house, even throughout strict 
social distancing period (day 63-91). Public transport has not been closed during COVID-19. 
Internal movement restriction was also on recommending to refrain from traveling from/to 
special disaster zones. Please see Supplementary Table 5 for a detailed description and 
references.  
 
Figure S1. Government response index and mobility restriction index, based on OxCGRT 
Facemask policy responses. KCDC’s official advice for mask-wearing before day 63 was that 
mask-wearing is only recommended for those showing symptoms, those caring for people 
with symptoms, those visiting medical facilities, those working in environments with a high 
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risk of infection, and those with underlying illness54. Only since strict social distancing (day 
63), KCDC has recommended the general public to wear masks in crowded indoor spaces55. 
Mask wearing has been also mandatory in public transport in Seoul from day 115 and in the 
nation from day 12856.  
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Supplementary Table 1. Linear fit result  
 
Traffic Volume vs. Number of Confirmed Cases 
 Phase   Estimate Standard 
error 
t P-value R2 Adjusted 
R2 
F Significance F 
Trigger Intercept -1.44e-3 5.61e-3 -0.257 0.800 0.320 0.294 12.22 1.71e-3 
Coeff. 0.036 0.010 3.496 1.71e-3 
Escalation Intercept 0.029 3.98e-3 7.18 5.94e-7 0.941 0.938 317.5 9.68e-14 
Coeff. 0.013 7.51e-4 17.82 9.68e-14 
Peak 1 Intercept 0.088 7.11e-3 12.324 2.86e-13 0.027 -5.67e-3 0.825 0.371 
Coeff. 4.35e-4 4.78e-4 0.908 0.371 
De-
escalation 
Intercept 0.063 7.36e-3 8.564 2.72e-8 0.203 0.165 5.336 0.031 
Coeff. 5.25e-3 2.27e-3 2.310 0.031 
Re-
escalation 
Intercept 0.062 3.11e-3 20.054 1.26e-15 0.3304 0.3 10.86 3.30e-3 
Coeff. -1.44e-3 4.37e-4 -3.295 3.3e-3 
Peak 2 Intercept 0.042 3.85e-3 10.946 9.79e-16 0.090 0.074 5.741 0.020 
Coeff. -6.97e-4 2.91e-4 -2.396 0.080 
Subway Ridership vs. Number of Confirmed Cases 
 Phase   Estimate Standard 
error 
t P-value  Adjusted F Significance F 
Trigger Intercept 0.054 0.016 3.440 1.97e-3 0.022 -0.015 0.598 0.446 
Coeff. 0.022 0.029 0.773 0.446 
Escalation Intercept 0.117 0.015 7.89 1.45e-7 0.9157 0.9115 217.3 3.316e-12 
Coeff. 0.041 2.80e-3 14.741 3.32e-12 
Peak 1 Intercept 0.408 0.013 31.46 <2e-16 0.032 -6.25e-4 0.981 0.33 
Coeff. -8.63e-4 8.71e-4 -0.99 0.33 
De-
escalation 
Intercept 0.321 9.81e-3 32.743 <2e-16 0.358 0.327 11.71 2.56e-3 
Coeff. 0.010 3.03e-3 3.422 2.56e-3 
Re-
escalation 
Intercept 0.326 7.85e-3 41.535 <2e-16 0.450 0.425 18 3.332e-4 
Coeff. -4.68e-3 1.10e-3 -4.243 3.33e-4 
Peak 2 Intercept 0.209 9.12e-3 22.882 <2e-16 0.112 0.097 7.309 8.99e-3 
Coeff. 1.86e-3 6.89e-4 2.703 8.99e-3 
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Supplementary Table 2. Changing Point Detection (CPD) Results  
Trip  
mode 
Day of 
Week 
Time-of-
day 
Intervention 
Estimates: Day  
95% confidence 
intervals 
Fitted Values 
Subway All week All Hours 
(5-24) 
34(3), 63(13), 
91(19), 126(19), 
161(13) 
{34(1), 34(5)}, 
{56(14), 73(17)}, 
{91(1), 93(3)}, 
{125(11), 
128(15)}, 
{156(19), 165(4)} 
8.5, 42.2, 39.3, 31.8, 
26.2, 22.7 
Afternoon 
Off-peak 
(14-17) 
33(3), 63(2), 
91(3), 120(1), 
157(3) 
{33(2), 34(2)}, 
{60(1), 68(3)}, 
{89(2), 93(3)}, 
{114(1), 128(2)}, 
{154(3), 161(3)} 
12.1, 48.7, 42.8, 34.5, 
30.2, 24.6 
Nighttime 
(21-24) 
33(2), 91(3), 
126(3), 160(3) 
{33(1), 33(3)}, 
{89(2), 93(1)}, 
{120(1), 138(3)}, 
{159(1), 164(2)} 
11.4, 47.2, 37.6, 33.5, 
27.5 
Weekday 
(M-F) 
All Hours 
(5-24) 
24(5), 
43(12),62(19), 
84(19), 108(19) 
{24(3), 24(7)}, 
{40(7), 48(19)}, 
{62(8), 63(14)}, 
{82(4), 87(7)}, 
{107(6), 111(13)} 
9.7, 38.5, 35.0, 27.3, 
23.6, 19.8 
Commute 
Hours (8-
9, 18-20) 
24(3), 53(4), 
73(1), 93(4) 
{24(2), 24(4)}, 
{51(3), 55(2)}, 
{72(2), 75(3)}, 
{90(4), 94(4)} 
5.1, 29.8, 24.3, 19.0, 
14.3 
Weekend 
(Sa,S) 
All Hours 
(5-24) 
21(2), 33(12), 
43(12), 53(12) 
{21(1), 21(5)}, 
{33(8), 34(13)}, 
{43(5), 43(16)}, 
{51(16), 53(17)} 
17.3, 49.6, 43.3, 36.3, 
29.7 
Traffic 
volume 
All week All Hours 
(0-24) 
33(21), 63(22), 
92(6), 137(6) 
{33(13), 34(4)}, 
{{52(19), 76(10)}, 
{90(19), 93(23)}, 
{135(2), 142(19)} 
2.0, 13.3, 11.5, 6.7, 
4.2 
Afternoon 
Off-peak 
(14-17) 
33(3), 63(3), 
92(2) 
{31(2), 35(2)}, 
{56(1), 76(3)}, 
{90(3), 96(3)} 
1.7, 8.3, 5.6, 1.7 
Nighttime 
(21-24) 
33(2), 62(3), 
92(3), 137(3) 
{32(3), 34(1)}, 
{55(3), 69(2)}, 
{90(3), 94(3)}, 
{131(1), 149(2)} 
4.9, 20.8, 16.7, 8.8, 
5.5 
Weekday 
(M-F) 
All Hours 
(0-24) 
23(20), 63(6) {23(6), 24(8)}, 
{62(17), 64(6)} 
2.5, 9.6, 4.3 
Commute 
Hours (8-
9, 18-20) 
No intervention 
found 
No intervention 
found 
1.9 
Weekend 
(Sa,S) 
All Hours 
(0-24) 
22(6), 32(21), 
41(23), 49(20) 
{22(2), 22(11)}, 
{29(22), 34(18)}, 
{41(2), 43(5)}, 
{49(6), 50(22)} 
6.9, 18.4, 15.1, 10.0, 
5.3 
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Supplementary Table 3. Summary of changes among amendments on “disclosure of itinerary 
and information of confirmed patients” 
 1st edition (day 55) 2nd edition (day 84) 3rd edition (day 163) 
Duration of 
information 
disclosure 
- Information is disclosed 
for 14 days after the 
patients had the last 
contact 
Information is disclosed 
for 14 days after the 
patients had the last 
contact, and should be 
deleted after the 
duration 
Temporal scope of 
information 
From 1 day before 
symptom onset or 
SARS-CoV-2 testing to 
the day of quarantine 
From 2 days before 
symptom onset or 
SARS-CoV-2 testing to 
the day of quarantine 
From 2 days before 
symptom onset or 
SARS-CoV-2 testing to 
the day of quarantine 
Spatial scope of 
information  
 
Places where all 
contacts have been 
identified may not be 
disclosed 
Places where all 
contacts have been 
identified may not be 
disclosed 
Places where all 
contacts have been 
identified should not be 
disclosed 
Detailed address and 
name of workplace 
should not be disclosed 
for privacy 
*workplace may be 
disclosed if there is a 
risk of spreading to 
unidentified employees 
 
Detailed address and 
name of workplace* 
should not be disclosed 
for privacy  
*workplace may be 
disclosed if there is a 
risk of spreading to 
unidentified employees 
Gender, age, nationality, 
detailed address and 
name of workplace 
should not be disclosed 
for privacy 
*workplace may be 
disclosed if there is a 
risk of spreading to 
unidentified employees 
Subject of information 
disclosure for cluster 
cases 
Municipal governments Municipal governments KCDC 
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Supplementary Table 4. Summary of datasets used in this study  
 
Category Region Period Frequen
cy 
Name Description Source 
Epidemiol
ogy 
Nationwid
e 
Jan 20, 
2020 – 
Jul 26, 
2020 
Daily COVID-19 
case 
Number of confirmed cases;  COVID-
19 open 
data1; 
KCDC2 
Contact 
tracing 
Contact tracing information 
of confirmed patients in 
Seoul 
Trip mode Seoul Jan 20, 
2020 – 
Jul 26, 
2020 
Hourly Subway 
ridership 
Hourly subway ridership 
counts extracted from the 
smart card usage information 
Seoul 
Metro4 
Traffic 
volume 
Hourly traffic volume at 100 
count locations 
Seoul 
TOPIS5 
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Supplementary Table 5. Summary of government responses for thirteen policy indicators  
Category Day Description Authority Score Regionality Source 
School 
closure  
(C1 of 
OxCGRT) 
~ 34 Decision not to delay school opening 
(day 9) 
  
According to the manual*, it is not 
recommended to close school 
because students can spread the 
epidemic epidemic outside the 
school. For schools to decide 
whether to delay opening, they need 
to consult with infectious disease 
experts and the Minister of Health 
and Welfare. (day 11) 
Ministry of 
Education 
0-No 
measure 
- https://news.
kbs.co.kr/new
s/view.do?ncd
=4370426 
  
http://www.h
ani.co.kr/arti/
society/school
ing/926453.ht
ml 
35 ~ 
121 
Postpone school opening as alert 
level was raised to 4 (the highest) 
Ministry of 
Education 
3-Require 
closing all 
levels 
1-
Nationwide 
https://www.
mk.co.kr/new
s/society/vie
w/2020/02/1
87047/ 
122   Plans to resume school opening for 
-Grade 12 (day 122) 
-Grade 1,2,9,11 (day 129) 
-Grade 3,4,8,10 (day 136) 
-Grade 5,6,7 (day 141) 
Ministry of 
Education 
2-Require 
closing (only 
some levels) 
1-
Nationwide 
https://imnew
s.imbc.com/ne
ws/2020/soci
ety/article/57
55259_32633.
html 
131 
~on
goin
g 
Limit the number of students 
attending school to two-thirds in all 
high schools and to a third in all 
middle and elementary schools in 
Seoul Metropolitan area and other 
cities 
Ministry of 
Education, 
Provincial 
Office of 
Education 
2-Require 
closing (only 
some levels) 
0-Specific 
region 
http://news.k
bs.co.kr/news
/view.do?ncd=
4458212 
 
Category Day Description Authority Score Regionality Source 
Workplace 
closure 
(C2 of 
OxCGRT) 
  
8~ As the alert level was raised to 3, the 
Ministry of Industry distributes 
standard plans to workplaces and 
recommends teleconferencing and 
remote working. 
Ministry of 
Industry 
1-
Recommend 
closing or 
work-from-
home 
1-
Nationwide 
https://news.
mt.co.kr/mtvi
ew.php?no=20
20013111581
196166 
63-
91 
Strict social distancing  
(equivalent to level 3 social 
distancing) 
- For public institutions, all but the 
essential personnel are required to 
work at home 
-For the private sector, it is 
recommended that employees work 
at home. 
Central 
Disaster and 
Safety 
Countermeas
ures 
Headquarter 
(CDSCHQ) 
2-Require 
closing or 
work-from-
home for 
some sectors 
or categories 
of workers 
1-
Nationwide 
http://www.m
ohw.go.kr/rea
ct/al/sal0301
vw.jsp?PAR_M
ENU_ID=04&
MENU_ID=040
3&page=1&CO
NT_SEQ=3536
73 
92~
107 
Social distancing with eased 
restrictions  (equivalent to level 
2 social distancing) 
- Public institutions are required to 
adopt work-from-home or staggered 
shifts for a half of employees  
- Private companies are 
recommended to adopt a similar 
approach as suggested for public 
institutions  
CDSCHQ 2-Require 
closing or 
work-from-
home for 
some sectors 
or categories 
of workers 
1-
Nationwide 
http://ncov.m
ohw.go.kr/tcm
BoardView.do?
contSeq=3541
12 
36 
108
~on
goin
g 
Social distancing in daily life 
(equivalent to level 1 social 
distancing) 
- Public institutions are required to 
adopt work-from-home or staggered 
shifts for a third of employees 
- Private companies are 
recommended to adopt a similar 
approach as suggested for public 
institutions  
CDSCHQ 2-Require 
closing or 
work-from-
home for 
some sectors 
or categories 
of workers 
1-
Nationwide 
https://www.
mois.go.kr/cm
m/fms/FileDo
wn.do?atchFil
eId=FILE_000
93124diwmSH
r&fileSn=0 
 
Category Day Description Authority Score Regionality Source 
Cancel 
public 
events 
(C3 of 
OxCGRT) 
24 The need to postpone or cancel the 
collective event is low, and it is 
recommended to carry out various 
events, but with the prevention 
measures. 
Central 
Disaster 
Management. 
Headquarter 
(CDMHQ) 
0 - No 
measure 
1-
Nationwide 
http://ncov.mo
hw.go.kr/tcmBo
ardView.do?con
tSeq=352840 
34~ Recommend not to hold public 
events and crowd gatherings, 
including those in small indoor 
spaces such as religious or outdoor 
events 
CDSCHQ 1 - 
Recommend 
cancelling 
1-
Nationwide 
https://www.ha
nkyung.com/po
litics/article/20
20022265597 
63~
91 
Strict social distancing  
(equivalent to level 3 social 
distancing) 
An administrative order is issued to 
prohibit public events and meetings 
where 10 or more people are 
involved. Sports events are also 
suspended. 
CDSCHQ 2 - Require 
cancelling 
1-
Nationwide 
http://www.mo
hw.go.kr/react/
al/sal0301vw.js
p?PAR_MENU_I
D=04&MENU_I
D=0403&page=
1&CONT_SEQ=3
53673 
92~
107 
Social distancing with eased 
restrictions  (equivalent to level 
2 social distancing) 
Mandatory events such as national 
holidays are set according to the 
number of people, and it is 
recommended that any events held 
in the public and private sectors 
such as local festivals, exhibitions, 
briefing sessions, and fairs be 
postponed or canceled.  
CDSCHQ 1 - 
Recommend 
cancelling 
1-
Nationwide 
http://ncov.mo
hw.go.kr/tcmBo
ardView.do?con
tSeq=354112 
108
~13
0 
Social distancing in daily life 
(equivalent to level 1 social 
distancing) 
If a large number of people need to 
gather, free up space to keep a 
distance of 2m or change the 
gathering time. 
CDSCHQ No measure - https://www.m
ois.go.kr/cmm/f
ms/FileDown.d
o?atchFileId=FI
LE_00093124di
wmSHr&fileSn=
0 
131
~on
goin
g 
Strict measures re-imposed in the 
Seoul Metropolitan area  
It is recommended that residents of 
the metropolitan area refrain from 
going out, meetings, and events that 
are unnecessary. 
CDSCHQ 1 - 
Recommend 
cancelling 
0 – specific 
region 
 
 
http://ncov.mo
hw.go.kr/tcmBo
ardView.do?con
tSeq=354773 
 
Category Day Description Authority Score Regionality Source 
Restriction 
on 
gathering 
(C4 of 
OxCGRT) 
24 - When organizing events such as 
large-scale events, festivals, and 
exams, the health authorities have 
prepared recommendations for 
reference by the host organization 
CDMHQ 0 - No 
measure 
- http://ncov.m
ohw.go.kr/tcm
BoardView.do?
contSeq=3528
40 
37 
 
- The need to postpone or cancel the 
collective event is low, and it is 
recommended to carry out various 
events with sufficient quarantine 
measures 
34~ It is advised to refrain from crowded 
events in a narrow indoor space, 
including religious events or 
outdoor events  
CDSCHQ 1-
Recommenda
tion on 
refraining 
from 
gatherings 
1-
Nationwide 
https://www.
hankyung.com
/politics/articl
e/202002226
5597 
63~ 
92 
Strict social distancing 
(equivalent to level 3 social 
distancing) 
An administrative order is issued to 
prohibit public events and meetings 
where 10 or more people are 
involved. Sports events are also 
suspended. 
CDSCHQ 4 - 
Restrictions 
on gatherings 
of 10 people 
or less 
1-
Nationwide 
http://www.m
ohw.go.kr/rea
ct/al/sal0301
vw.jsp?PAR_M
ENU_ID=04&
MENU_ID=040
3&page=1&CO
NT_SEQ=3536
73 
93~ 
107 
Social distancing with eased 
restrictions (equivalent to level 2 
social distancing) 
An administrative order is issued to 
prohibit public events and meetings 
where 50 or more people are 
involved in indoor gatherings and 
100 or more for outdoors 
CDSCHQ 3 - 
Restrictions 
on gatherings 
between 11-
100 people 
1-
Nationwide 
http://ncov.m
ohw.go.kr/tcm
BoardView.do?
contSeq=3541
12 
108~ Social distancing in daily life 
(equivalent to level 1 social 
distancing) 
No specific guidelines regarding 
gathering restrictions except for 
complying with sufficient 
quarantine measures 
CDSCHQ 0 - No 
measure 
1-
Nationwide 
https://www.
mois.go.kr/cm
m/fms/FileDo
wn.do?atchFil
eId=FILE_000
93124diwmSH
r&fileSn=0 
111~
ongoi
ng 
Strict measures applied to 
specific places in Seoul 
Metropolitan area 
An administrative order is issued to 
prohibit gatherings at specific 
places such as nightlife venues (day 
111~ongoing) and karaoke (day 
124~175) . 
Seoul 
Metropolitan 
government 
3 - 
Restrictions 
on gatherings 
between 11-
100 people 
0-Specified 
region 
 
 
http://www.h
ani.co.kr/arti/
area/capital/9
54825.html 
 131~
ongoi
ng 
Strict measures re-imposed in the 
Seoul Metropolitan area  
It is recommended that residents of 
the metropolitan area refrain from 
going out, meetings, and events that 
are unnecessary. 
CDSCHQ 1-
Recommenda
tion on 
refraining 
from 
gatherings 
0 – specific 
region 
 
 
http://ncov.m
ohw.go.kr/tcm
BoardView.do?
contSeq=3547
73 
 
 
  
38 
Category Day Description Authority Score Region Source 
Close public 
transport 
(C5 of 
OxCGRT) 
- No measure  - 0 - No 
measure 
-   
 
 
Category Day Description Authority Score Region/ta
rget 
Source 
Stay-at-
home 
requiremen
t 
(C6 of 
OxCGRT) 
35- It is advised to refrain from moving 
from/to special disaster zone  
 KCDC 1-
Recommend 
not leaving 
house 
0-specific 
region  
http://www.
mohw.go.kr/r
eact/al/sal03
01vw.jsp?PAR
_MENU_ID=04
&MENU_ID=0
403&page=1
&CONT_SEQ=
353089 
41-42, 
48-49, 
55-56, 
61-62 
It is advised to stay at home during 
the weekends 
KCDC 1-
Recommend 
not leaving 
house 
1-
Nationwide 
https://www.
donga.com/n
ews/Society/
article/all/20
200307/1000
51616/1 
 
http://www.d
onga.com/ne
ws/List/articl
e/all/202003
20/10025585
8/1 
63-91 Strict social distancing (equivalent 
to level 3 social distancing) 
It is advised to refrain from going out 
except for daily necessities, medical 
institution visits, and commuting 
CDSCHQ 1-
Recommend 
not leaving 
house 
1-
Nationwide 
http://www.
mohw.go.kr/r
eact/al/sal03
01vw.jsp?PAR
_MENU_ID=04
&MENU_ID=0
403&page=1
&CONT_SEQ=
353673 
92~107 Social distancing with eased 
restrictions (equivalent to level 2 
social distancing) 
It is advised to refrain from meetings, 
outings, and events that are not 
necessary or urgent. 
CDSCHQ 1-
Recommend 
not leaving 
house 
1-
Nationwide 
http://ncov.m
ohw.go.kr/tc
mBoardView.
do?contSeq=3
54112 
108~on
going 
Social distancing in daily life 
(equivalent to level 1 social 
distancing) 
It is advised for the elderly to refrain 
from going outside except for grocery 
purchases or visits to medical 
institutions and pharmacies 
CDSCHQ 1-
Recommend 
not leaving 
house 
0-targeted 
group 
(elderly) 
https://www.
mois.go.kr/c
mm/fms/File
Down.do?atch
FileId=FILE_0
0093124diw
mSHr&fileSn=
0 
131~on
going 
Strict measures re-imposed in the 
Seoul Metropolitan area  
It is recommended that residents of 
the metropolitan area refrain from 
going out, meetings, and events that 
are unnecessary. 
CDSCHQ 1-
Recommend 
not leaving 
house 
0 – 
targeted 
region 
http://ncov.m
ohw.go.kr/tc
mBoardView.
do?contSeq=3
54773 
 
Category Day Description Authority Score Region Source 
39 
Restrictions 
on internal 
movement 
(C7 of 
OxCGRT) 
 
35 - 
ongoi
ng 
It is advised to refrain from moving 
from/to special disaster zone  
KCDC 1-
Recommend 
not to travel 
between 
regions or 
cities 
0- specific 
region 
http://www.m
ohw.go.kr/reac
t/al/sal0301vw
.jsp?PAR_MENU
_ID=04&MENU
_ID=0403&pag
e=1&CONT_SE
Q=353089 
 
Category Day Description Authority Score Regionalit
y 
Source 
International 
travel 
control  
(C8 of 
OxCGRT) 
1~on
going 
As the alert level of quarantine for 
infectious diseases was raised from 
'interest' to 'attention', quarantine 
procedures were strengthened for 
all aircraft passengers 
For direct flights from Wuhan, the 
quarantine officer directly conducts 
an epidemiological investigation of 
all passengers 
 KCDC, 
Incheon airport 
1-Screening - https://www.
hankookilbo.c
om/News/Rea
d/202001211
778735559 
9~on
going 
All immigrants from China were 
asked to fill out their health status 
questionnaire and check with a 
quarantine officer. If symptoms are 
present, a quarantine investigation 
is conducted, and suspected patients 
are immediately quarantined at the 
discretion of the epidemiological 
investigator or managed in 
connection with the local 
government in charge. 
 KCDC 1-Screening -  
https://www.
yna.co.kr/vie
w/AKR20200
12601415101
7 
16~o
ngoin
g 
All foreigners who have visited or 
stayed in Hubei Province within 14 
days are prohibited from entering. 
 Government 3-Ban on 
arrivals from 
some regions 
- http://m.kore
a.kr/news/pol
icyNewsView.
do?newsId=14
8868777 
74~o
ngoin
g 
Mandatory 14-day quarantine is 
required for all international 
arrivals 
 Government 2-Quarantine 
arrivals from 
high-risk 
regions 
- http://ncov.m
ohw.go.kr/bar
oView2.do 
 
Category Day Description Authority Score Geospatial 
scope 
Source 
Public 
information 
campaigns  
(H1 of 
OxCGRT) 
~4 Updates related to COVID-19 
outbreak and suggested prevention 
measures were uploaded on the 
official website. Government 
announcements were 
communicated via TV and 
newspaper.  
KCDC 1-public 
officials 
urging 
caution 
about COVID-
19  
 
  
5~ KCDC started publishing daily 
briefing on its official website, TV 
and youtube 
KCDC, CDSCHQ 2-
coordinated 
public 
information 
campaign 
(e.g. across 
traditional 
and social 
media) 
1-
nationwide 
https://www.c
dc.go.kr/boar
d/board.es?mi
d=a20501000
000&bid=001
5 
40 
11~ Emergency SMS sent to the public Ministry of the 
Interior and 
Safety 
2-
coordinated 
public 
information 
campaign 
(e.g. across 
traditional 
and social 
media) 
1-
nationwide 
https://www.s
afekorea.go.kr
/idsiSFK/neo/
sfk/cs/sfc/dis
/disasterMsgL
ist.jsp?menuSe
q=679 
Category Day Description Authority Score Geospatial 
scope 
Source 
Testing 
policy  
(H2 of 
OxCGRT) 
~8 A person is able to be tested for new 
coronavirus infectious disease 
patients if 1) he/she had fever or 
respiratory symptoms within 14 
days after visiting China's Hubei 
Province (including Wuhan) or 2) he 
or she contacted with suspected 
patients and had fever or 
respiratory symptoms within 14 
days 
KCDC,MOHW 1 – Only 
those who 
both (a) have 
symptoms 
AND (b) 
meet specific 
criteria  
- https://www.
donga.com/ne
ws/Society/ar
ticle/all/2020
0206/995699
09/2  
19~o
ngoin
g 
Even if you do not have a history of 
visiting China, you will be able to 
receive a test for 'new coronavirus 
infection' according to your doctor's 
prescription. The total cost of 
inspection is fully supported by the 
government. If one wants to be 
tested without a doctor's opinion, 
he/she is not provided with the cost. 
KCDC,MOHW 3 – open 
public testing  
- https://www.c
dc.go.kr/boar
d/board.es?mi
d=a20507020
000&bid=001
9 
38~o
ngoin
g 
Drive through testing was first 
adopted in Seoul Metropolitan area  
KCDC, MOHW, 
Municipalities 
3 – open 
public testing  
- http://www.h
ani.co.kr/arti/
area/capital/9
33527.html 
 
 
Category Day Description Authority Score Geospatial 
scope 
Source 
Contact 
tracing 
(H3 of 
OxCGRT) 
1~ Comprehensive contact tracing 
conducted by epidemiology 
investigators 
MOHW, KCDC, 
municipalities 
2 - 
Comprehensi
ve contact 
tracing  
 https://www.
mois.go.kr/cm
m/fms/FileDo
wn.do?atchFil
eId=FILE_000
92842VodLEN
4&fileSn=0 
67~ Comprehensive contact tracing 
conducted via automated system  
MOHW, KCDC, 
municipalities 
2 - 
Comprehensi
ve contact 
tracing  
 http://www.k
orea.kr/comm
on/download.
do?tblKey=GM
N&fileId=1907
38345 
 
Category Day Description Authority Score Geospatial 
scope 
Source 
Income 
support  
(E1 of 
OxCGRT) 
73~ Employment maintenance subsidy 
(partial government burden on 
leave/holiday workers) 
 
Ministry of 
Employment 
and Labor 
1 - 
government 
is replacing 
less than 
50% of lost 
salary (or if a 
flat sum, it is 
- https://biz.ch
osun.com/site
/data/html_di
r/2020/03/25
/2020032501
311.html 
41 
less than 
50% median 
salary) 
 
Category Day Description Authority Score Geospatial 
scope 
Source 
Debt / 
contract 
relief for 
households  
(E2 of 
OxCGRT) 
19~ Expansion of new loans, interest 
rate discounts, extension of 
maturity, suspension of premium 
payment  
Financial 
Services 
Commission 
1 - Narrow 
relief, 
specific to 
one kind of 
contract 
- https://biz.ch
osun.com/site
/data/html_di
r/2020/02/28
/2020022802
350.html 
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